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ABSTRACT 
Applying the same methods and definitions as in Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005) this 
thesis seeks to empirically explain the relationship between default and recovery rates in 
the global corporate bond market. Findings in this thesis show that global default rates 
explain as much as 80 percent of the annual variation in associated recovery rates when 
results are based on the same time frame (1982-2001) as in Altman, Resti and Sironi 
(2005), and around 66 percent when most recent observations (1982-2012) are included 
to the analysis. This thesis supports the findings in Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005) of a 
significant and negative link between default and recovery rates. Findings of a negative 
relationship between default and recovery rates have important implications for credit-
risk-related models treating the recovery rate independent of the default rate, or 
probability of default. This thesis also analyzes the univariate and multivariate 
relationship between recovery rates and other market and macro based variables. Results 
from these tests shows that the bond default rate, in comparison to these variables, 
undoubtedly explains the highest degree of variation in recovery rates. On a univariate 
basis the supply of defaulted securities significantly explains from 20 to 60 percent of the 
variation in recovery rates, however, when added to the multivariate models, results are 
divergent and the supply of defaulted bonds show no significant explanatory contribution. 
The latter results differ from the central thesis in Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005), where 
the multivariate regression models assign a key role to the supply of defaulted bonds.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Risks have a central role in financial markets, and the Risks related to credit are as old as 
lending itself dating back to Babylon some 1800 BCE1. As in ancient Babylon, lenders still 
face the element of uncertainty regarding the borrower's ability to repay a particular loan. 
But as financial innovations have progressed credit risk has changed in many ways. Due to 
dramatic economic, political and technological change around the world, credit risk has 
grown exponentially. In all, credit risk has grown more complex, accordingly the need for 
accurate and reliable credit risk models are important. The field of credit risk management 
came to the world as the first banks where organized in Florence some 700 years ago, and 
has since then formed the core of their expertise2. Today financial economists, bank 
supervisors and regulators, and financial market practitioners devotes much attention to  
the measurement, pricing and management of credit risk, as virtually all financial 
contracts are affected by it3.  
To assess the credit risk related of a financial asset, three main variables must be 
considered: (i) the probability of default, (ii) the recovery rate and (iii) the exposure at 
default. While a significant portion of the literature on credit risk has been devoted to the 
estimation of default probabilities, less attention has been devoted to the estimation of 
recovery rate and the association between default and recovery3. Jankowitsch, Nagler and 
Subrahmanyam (2014) argue that it is important to better understand the stochastic 
nature of recovery rates as credit risk models fails to explain observed yield spreads. 
With the aim at empirically explain the variation annual aggregate recovery rates Altman, 
Resti and Sironi (2005) study the link between default and recovery rates in the U.S. 
corporate bond market, and successfully find a significant and negative link between these 
two variables. Applying the same methods and definitions as in Altman, Resti and Sironi 
(2005), I have empirically analyzed whether this relationship is present in the global 
corporate bond market. My economic univariate models show that global default rates 
                                                        
1 Homer, S., & Sylla, R. (1991). "A history of interest rates." Third edition 
2Altman, Edward I., Andrea Resti, and Andrea Sironi, eds. Recovery risk: The next challenge in credit risk 
management. Risk Books, 2005. 
3 Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005) 
7 
 
explains a significant portion of the annual variation in associated recovery rates across all 
seniority levels.  
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION 
As the main purpose of this thesis is to empirically analyze and explain the relationship 
between default and recovery rates in the global corporate bond market, and to see if the 
findings in Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005) also apply in this market, I attempt to clarify 
the following main and sub issues: 
Is there a significant and negative relationship between default and recovery rates present in 
the global corporate bond market? 
Are there other variables that better explain the variation in recovery rates than default 
rates? 
Are global bond recovery rates a function of the supply and demand for defaulted securities 
and the default rates? 
1.2 STRUCTURE 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature.  Section 3 gives a 
detailed overview of the definitions, explanatory variables and empirical evidence in 
Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005). Section 4 provides details of the data and explanatory 
variables used in my analysis. Section 5 presents the descriptive analysis and the results of 
the regression models. Section 6 provides a comparison between findings in Altman, Resti 
and Sironi (2005) my study. Section 7 examines the robustness of the regression models. 
Section 8 presents implications. Section 9 addresses weaknesses.  Section 10 concludes.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
As the majority of research on the association between aggregate default and recovery 
rates are embedded in credit risk modeling, it seems appropriate to start this literature 
review by presenting how the different credit risk models treat the default and recovery 
rates, and then subsequently present the most acknowledged, as well as the most recent 
contributions. The literature review and review of credit risk models is based on a detailed 
discussion of these subjects presented in Altman, Resti and Sironi (2001).  
2.1 CREDIT RISK 
The credit risk of a financial asset is affected by three main variables: (i) the probability of 
default; (ii) the "loss given default" (equals one minus the recovery rate); and (iii) the 
exposure at default.  In the following part I will present how different credit models treat 
the default and recovery rate. 
A significant portion of the literature on credit risk has been devoted to the estimation of 
default probabilities, while less attention has been devoted to the estimation of recovery 
rate and the association between default and recovery rates. Altman, Resti and Sironi 
(2001) find that this is a consequence of two related factors. First, since it is the systematic 
risk components of credit risk that attract risk premia, credit pricing models and risk 
management applications tend to focus it. Second, traditional credit risk models assumes 
that the recovery rate depend on individual features like collateral or seniority, which do 
not respond to systematic factors. During the past decade an increased number of studies 
have been dedicated to the subject of recovery rate estimation and the association 
between default and recovery rates. Altman, Resti and Sironi (2001) argues that this 
increase has partly revised the traditional focus on defaults, and is a consequence of the 
observed negative correlation between default and recovery rates in the U.S. market 
during the 1999-2002 period. 
2.2. DEFAULT AND RECOVERY RATES IN CREDIT RISK MODELING 
Credit risk models can be divided in to two main categories; (a) credit pricing models, and 
(b) portfolio credit value-at-risk (VaR) models. Credit pricing models can in turn be 
divided into three main approaches; (I) "first generation" structural-form models, (II) 
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"second generation" structural-form models, and (III) reduced-form models (Altman, 
Resti, & Sironi, 2001). 
2.2.1(I) FIRST GENERATION" STRUCTURAL-FORM MODELS  
These models was first introduced by Merton (1974) adapting the principles of option 
pricing (Black & Scholes, 1973). The basic framework from this model is that the process 
of default is driven by the value of the company's assets and liabilities. More precisely, 
Merton's intuition behind the model is that; defaults occur when a firms' asset value is less 
than the value of its liabilities. In practice this means that the payment/recovery to 
bondholders at maturity equals the face value if the firms' asset value is greater than face-
value of debt, and vice-versa. 
Under structural form models relevant credit risk elements, including default and 
recovery, are a function of the structural characteristics of the firm: business risk and 
financial risk.   In these models the payoff/recovery to bondholders is a function of the 
firm's residual assets value, thus treating the recovery rate as an endogenous variable. In 
Merton's theoretical structural-form framework the default probability and recovery rate 
are inversely related; if the firms value decreases, then its probability of default increases 
while the expected recovery rate at default decreases. On the other hand: if firm asset 
volatility decreases, its probability of default will decrease while the expected recovery 
rate will increase (Altman, Resti and Sironi (2001)). 
Jones, Mason and Rosenfeld (1984) provide evidence that a Merton-type model, even 
aimed at companies with very simple capital structures, is no better at pricing investment-
grade corporate bonds than a naive model assuming no default risk. The lack of success 
has been attributed to three different factors. First of all, a firm can only default at 
maturity of the debt. Second, the structure of debt seniority needs to be specified when 
valuating default-risky debt of firms with more than one class of debt in its capital 
structure.  Third and lastly, Merton's framework also assumes that, in the event of default, 
the absolute-priority rules are adhered, meaning that the payoff to bondholders is paid off 
in the order of their seniority.  
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2.2.2 (II) "SECOND GENERATION" STRUCTURAL-FORM MODELS  
These models adopt Merton's original framework concerning the default process, but 
remove the assumption that defaults only occur at the maturity of debt. Instead, "second 
generation" structural-form models implements that default can occur at any time 
between the issuance and maturity of debt (Altman, Resti, and Sironi, 2001).. 
In the event of default, these models treat the recovery rate as an exogenous variable, 
independent from firm asset value and defined as a fixed ratio of outstanding debt, thus 
independent from the default probability. In these models the recovery rate is generally 
defined as a fixed ratio of the outstanding debt value. 
By observing the historic default and recovery rate for various classes of debt, Longstaff 
and Schwartz (1995) reason that, one can estimate a reliable recovery rate, given firms are 
comparable. In their model they allow for correlation between defaults and interest rates 
and a stochastic term structure of interest rates. Compared to first generation models, this 
approach is somewhat simpler, since it, first, exogenously specifies the cash-flows to risky 
debt in the event of default, and second, defines default by some exogenously specified 
boundary of the underlying asset value (Altman, Resti, and Sironi, 2001).  
By empirically testing both first-and second generation structural-form models, Eom, 
Helwege and Huang (2001) find that almost all these models, on average, predict spreads 
that are too high relative to those observed in the bond market. The only exception is 
Merton's model where the predicted spreads are too low.  Concerning the second 
generation models, they find that low prediction accuracy is a problem since the models 
tend to severely overstate the credit risk of firms with high leverage or volatility. Altman, 
Resti and Sironi (2001) argue that the poor performance is caused by three main 
drawbacks. First, these models require unobservable estimates for firm asset value 
parameters. Second, it is not possible to incorporate changes in credit-rating. This is 
viewed as a drawback since most corporate bonds undergo credit downgrades before they 
actually default. They also address that any credit risk model should take into account the 
uncertainty associated to changes in credit rating as well as uncertainty concerning 
default. Lastly, the majority of structural-form models assume that firm value is modeled 
continuous in time, implying that a default can be predicted just before it happens, and 
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consequently, there are no sudden surprises as the default probability of a firm are known 
with certainty. 
2.2.3 (III) REDUCED-FORM MODELS  
These modes were introduced in the mid-1990s and primarily differ from reduced-and 
structural-form models in the way that defaults are treated. While defaults in structural-
form models are conditioned on some measure of the firm's asset value, no such 
assumptions are made in reduced-form models. In the reduced-form models the dynamics 
of default are exogenously specified by the default rate. Consequently, the price on credit 
sensitive debt can be calculated as if they were risk free by applying the risk free rate 
adjusted by the default rate. In reduced form models the recovery rate is also exogenously 
specified and independent from the default probability. 
Regarding how the recovery rate is parameterized, Altman, Resti and Sironi (2001) find 
that reduced-form models are somewhat different from each other. For instance, they find 
that while Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) in their model assume that the recovery at default 
equals an exogenously specified fraction of a corresponding default-free bond, while other 
reduced-form models assume that the recovery rates for bonds of the same issuer, 
seniority, and face value, is the same regardless of time until maturity. Jarrow, Lando and 
Turnbull (1997) allow different debt seniorities to translate into different recovery rates 
for a given firm, while Zhou (2001) attempt to combine the advantages in structural and 
reduced-form models, and links the recovery rate to the firm value at default so that the 
variation in the recovery rate is endogenously generated (Altman, Resti, and Sironi, 2001). 
2.2.4 VALUE AT RISK (VaR) MODELS 
Developed by both banks and consultant firms4, and aim at measuring the potential loss a 
credit portfolio can suffer, given a predetermined confidence level and time horizon. In 
these models the recovery rate is typically regarded as an exogenous and constant 
parameter or a stochastic variable independent from the default probability, and thus, 
treating the recovery rate independent of the default probability (Altman, Resti and Sironi 
(2001)). 
                                                        
4 J.P. Morgan’s CreditMetrics® (Gupton, Finger and Bhatia [1997]), McKinsey’s CreditPortfolioView® 
(Wilson [1997a, 1997b and 1998]),  
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2.3 RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS AND ACKNOWLEDGED STUDIES 
In the following section I will present both well established and recent literature 
concerning the behavior of recovery rates and its relationship with defaults.  
Both Finger (1999) and Gordy (2000) propose conditional models where defaults are 
driven by one systematic factor, namely the state of the economy, rather than a multitude 
of correlation parameters, and where recovery rates are affected by the same economic 
conditions. Thus, these models assume that the same economic conditions causing defaults 
to increase that cause recovery rates to decrease. Further, they provide evidence that 
recovery rates fluctuates with the intensity of defaults (Altman, Resti, and Sironi, 2001).  
Frye (2000a and 2000b) propose a model where both the probability of default and the 
recovery rate depends on the state of a systematic factor. In this model the recovery rate 
and default probability are mutually dependent on the systematic factor, accordingly the 
correlation between the two variables derives from this common relationship. The simple 
intuition behind this theoretical model is that, when a debtor defaults on a loan, a bank's 
recovery may be determined by the collateral loan value, which again depends on the 
economic conditions. This means that if the economy is in a downturn, recoveries may 
decrease just as defaults tend to increase, yielding a negative correlation between 
recovery and default rates. In Frye's original model5 recovery rates are implied from an 
equation that determines the collateral value. Recovery rates in Frye (2000b) are 
calculated directly, allowing him to use U.S bond market data to empirically test the 
relationship between default and recoveries. Results from this analysis show a strong 
negative correlation between the two variables. This empirical analysis allows Frye to 
draw the conclusion that in a severe economic recession, bond recoveries might decline 
20-25 percentage points from their normal average.  
Jarrow (2001) presents a novel approach for estimating recovery rates and default 
probabilities which are implicit in both debt and equity prices (Altman, Resti, and Sironi, 
2001). Jarrow (2001), as in Frye (2000a and 2000b), assume that recovery rates and 
default probabilities are correlated and dependent on the state of the economy. The 
difference is that Jarrow's methodology separates the identification of recovery rates and 
                                                        
5 Frye (2000a) 
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default probabilities by explicitly incorporating equity prices into the analysis. Due to the 
high variability in the yield spread between U.S. treasury securities and risky debt, Jarrow 
also includes a liquidity premium in the estimation procedure.  
Carey and Gordy (2001) analyze loss-given-default (LGD6) measures and their correlation 
with default rates using four different datasets. They find that estimates of simple default 
rate-LDG correlation are close to zero, and suggest that a weak or asymmetric relationship 
may be influenced by different components of the economic cycle. They conclude that the 
basic intuition behind Frye's model may not adequately describe the link between 
recovery rates and defaults (Altman, Resti, and Sironi, 2001). 
Through a comprehensive analysis of various assumptions regarding the association 
between aggregate default probabilities and the loss given default on corporate bonds and 
bank loans, Altman, Resti and Sironi (2001) seek to empirically explain the relationship 
between defaults and recoveries. They find that aggregate recovery rates basically is a 
function of supply and demand for the securities, and provide evidence of a significant 
negative correlation between aggregate default rates and recovery rates on corporate 
bonds. They also argue that their economic univariate and multivariate time series models 
describe a considerable share of the variance in bond recovery rates aggregated across all 
seniority and collateral levels.  
Jokivuolle and Peura (2000) propose a rather different approach where the collateral 
value is correlated with the default probability, and where the option pricing framework is 
applied for modeling risky debt. In this model the borrowing firm's total asset-value 
determines the event of default, and the collateral value is assumed to be the only 
stochastic element determining the recovery rate. Due to the latter assumption, there is no 
need to estimate the firm asset value parameters since the model can be implemented 
using an exogenous default probability (Altman, Resti, and Sironi, 2001). From this study 
Jokivuolle and Peura find that the expected recovery rate is a decreasing function of the 
collateral volatility, and that defaults are driven by the correlation between collateral and 
firm value. A rather counterintuitive result is that the expected recovery rate increases 
when the default probability increases. Altman, Resti and Sironi (2001) argues that the 
                                                        
6 Loss given default = 1 – recovery rate 
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findings from this model are rather unrealistic since it assumes that the asset value chosen 
as collateral tends to be uncorrelated with the borrower's prospect, and that not all loans 
are fully collateralized. 
Based on an analysis of approximately 2,000 defaulted bonds and loans, Hanson and 
Schuermann (2004) provide evidence on the impact of seniority and industry affiliation on 
the recovery rate. These results are in line with Altman and Kishore (1996), which 
conclude that that the highest average recoveries come from public utilities and chemical, 
petroleum and related products, and that original bond ratings have little or no effect on 
recovery, once seniority is accounted for.  Furthermore, Hanson and Schuermann study 
the empirical distribution of recovery rates and provide evidence that recoveries are 
lower during economic downturn.  
Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005) examine the link between aggregate default 
rates/probabilities and recovery rates on U.S. corporate bonds, from both a theoretical and 
an empirical standpoint. They suggest that the literature on credit-risk-management 
models and tools appears somewhat simplistic and unrealistic, as recovery rates usually 
are treated as a function of the historic average recovery rates and independent from 
default rates. Examining the recovery rate on corporate bond defaults over the period 
1982-2001, they find that recovery rates are a function of the supply and demand for 
defaulted bonds and the default rates, where the default rate plays a pivotal role. They do 
recognize a systematic relationship between macroeconomic performance measures and 
expected default rates. However, they conclude that these variables are less important as 
their explanatory power is considerable lower. Definitions, explanatory variables and 
empirical evidence applied in Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005) is presented in detail in 
section 3. 
Through a comprehensive analysis of industry-wide distress and its relation to recovery 
rates at default, Acharya et al. (2007) argue that when defaulting firms operate in an 
industry witnessing industry-wide distress, debt recovery is 10% to 15% less on average.  
They believe that the main mechanism causing this effect is that defaulting firm, which 
operate in a distressed industry experience a lower ability to sell their assets to 
competitors. They also document that aggregate default rates have a negative effect on the 
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recovery rates of individual issues, and provide some evidence that balance sheet ratios 
are of importance. Focusing on the modeling of the ultimate recovery rate distribution for 
defaulted bonds and loans, Altman and Kalotay (2012) provide further evidence these 
industry-driven effects. 
Examining default event type Bris, Welch and Zhu (2006) and Davydenko and Franks 
(2008) find that the reorganization practices and the differences in creditors' rights are 
reflected in the level of recovery and default resolution. In these studies defaults across 
different countries, jurisdictions, and different bankruptcy procedures7 are compared. 
Discussing distressed exchanges Altman and Karlin (2009) provide further evidence on 
the importance of the default event type, finding that recoveries at default are higher in 
distressed exchanges compared to other default event types.  
Based on a comprehensive set of traded prices and volumes around various types of 
default events, Jankowitsch, Nagler, and Subrahmanyam (2012) examine the recovery on 
US corporate bonds over the time period 2002 to 2010. A detailed study on the 
microstructure of trading activity allows them to assess the liquidity of defaulted bonds, 
and to estimate reliable market-based recovery rates. They find that 64% of the total 
variance in the recovery rates across bonds is explained by quantifying the relation 
between these recovery rates and a comprehensive set of bond characteristics, firm 
fundamentals, macroeconomic variables and liquidity measures. They also find that 
transaction costs metrics of liquidity along with balance sheet ratios motivated by 
structural credit risk models, and macroeconomic variables are particularly important 
determinants of the recovery rate. Furthermore, they provide evidence that the type of 
default event, the bond seniority, and the industry in which the firm operates are of 
importance, in explaining the recovery rate. 
My thesis extends the existing literature by empirically testing whether the findings in 
Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005) holds for the global corporate bond market. Accordingly, I 
will in the following section present a more thorough summary of the practical and 
theoretical framework applied in Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005). 
                                                        
7 Chapter 7 versus Chapter 11bankruptcy filing 
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3. ALTMAN, RESTI AND SIRONI (2005) -  
DEFINITIONS, EXPLANATORY VARIABLES AND 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
In this section the definitions, explanatory variables and empirical evidence applied in 
Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005) is presented 
3.1 DEPENDENT VARIABLE - ANNUAL AGGREGATE RECOVERY RATE 
The aggregate annual bond recovery rate (BRR), as well as its logarithm (BRRL), is 
measured by the weighted average recovery on all corporate bond defaults over the 
period 1982-2001 in the U.S. Bond market.  The weights used are based on the market 
value of defaulting debt issues of publicly traded companies.  The market value of 
defaulted debt is measured as the closing "bid" levels on or as close to the default date as 
possible.  
     
∑                            
 
   
∑                             
 
    
                   
3.2 DATA, AND SAMPLE SIZE 
The speculative-grade bond market is used as the population base, since practically all 
public corporate bond defaults most immediately migrate to default from the non-
investment grade segment of the market. Data is gathered from a database constructed 
and maintained by NYU Salomon Center, and contains both quarterly and annual averages 
from about 1,300 defaulted bonds. 
3.3 EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
In this section the variables which Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005) argues that could 
explain the variation in aggregate recovery rates, are presented. The expected effect of 
these variables on recovery rates is indicated by a plus or minus sign. The first five 
variables relates to the corporate bond market, while the last five are macroeconomic 
variables.   
BDR (-) & BLDR (-): The bond default rate is defined as the weighted average default rate, 
on bonds in the high-yield bond market. The weights are based on the face value of all U.S. 
high-yield bonds outstanding each year and the size of each defaulting issue within a 
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particular year. The high-yield or non-investment grade segment of the market is used as 
population base, as virtually all public defaults most immediately migrate to default from 
this segment. The value of a bond at default is assumed to equal the par-value. A variable 
measuring the distressed but not defaulted proportion of the high-yield bond market is 
excluded from Altman's analysis due to the lack of observations. They define distressed 
issues as bonds yielding more than 1,000 basis points over the 10-year risk-free treasury 
rate. It is assumed that an increase in defaults has a negative effect on the recovery rate.  
     
∑                                    
 
   
                                                         
               
BDRC (-): The 1-year change in bond default rate (BDR). The intuition behind the negative 
effect is that; if default rates increases from one year to another, recovery rates will 
decrease.  
                  
BOA (-): Measured at midyear and in trillions of dollars, BOA is defined as the aggregate 
amount of U.S. high-yield bonds outstanding for a particular year. This amount represents 
the potential supply of defaulted securities. Due to yearly growth in the outstanding 
amount of high yield bonds over the sample period applied by Altman, Resti and Sironi 
(2005), the BOA variable picks up a time-series trend as well as representing a possible 
supply factor.  
                                                            
BDA (-): As an alternative to BOA, the more directly related value of the bond defaulted 
amount is also examined.  
GDP (+): The annual U.S. GDP growth rate. 
GDPC (+):  The change in annual GDP growth-rate from the previous year.  
                                           
GDPI (-): Applied as a dummy variable, taking the value of 1 when GDP growth is less than 
1.5% and 0 when the GDP growth rate is greater than 1.5%. 
SR (+): Annual percentage return on the S&P 500 stock index. 
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SCR (+): The change in the annual return on the S&P 500 stock index. 
               
3.4 THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF DISTRESSED SECURITIES 
Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005) describe the logic behind their demand/supply analysis as 
both intuitive and important. Important, since most credit risk models fails to statistically 
and formally consider this relationship. The intuition behind their demand/supply 
analysis is grounded on the relationship between defaults and recoveries on a 
macroeconomic level, where it is the same forces that cause defaults to rise during 
economic downturn which also cause the value of assets of distressed companies to 
depreciate. Declining asset values will most likely lower the value of the distressed 
companies' financial securities. Although the economic logic behind this intuition is clear, 
Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005) argue that macroeconomic variables such as GDP has 
failed to statistically describe a significant relationship with recovery rates. Hence, they 
hypothesized that; "if one drills down to the distressed firm market and its particular 
securities, one can expect a more significant and robust negative relationship between 
default and recovery rates"(Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005)). The demand-side is driven 
by the principal purchasers of defaulted securities. 
Based on periodic calculations in Altman and Jha (2003), Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005) 
finds that the supply of defaulted U.S. securities grew enormously during the economic 
downturn in 1990-01, to some $300 billion in face value, and then fell to much lower levels 
during the 1993-98 period and then grew to $940 billion USD in the turbulent 2001-02 
period. They also find that price levels on new defaulting securities are relatively lower 
during these economic downturns. The ratio between the supply- and the demand side is 
around 10 to 1 in both these economic downturns.  
3.5 FINDINGS FROM UNIVARIATE AND MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION 
In their analysis of the relationship between default and recovery rates, Altman, Resti and 
Sironi (2005) apply both univariate and multivariate regression models. In the following 
section I will present findings from these models.  
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3.5.1 FINDINGS - UNIVARIATE MODELS (APPENDIX 1 A & B) 
In the univariate regression both the recovery rate (BRR) and its natural logarithm (BLRR) 
is applied as dependent variables. Results are obtained regressing the BRR and BLRR 
against the all aforementioned explanatory variables. Results from the univariate 
regressions is presented in appendix 1 A and B. Examining the univariate relationship 
between BRR and bond default rate (BDR) for the period 1982-2001 they find that 51% of 
the variation in annual recovery rates is explained by the level of default rates. 
Logarithmic and power regressions yield an explanatory power of 60% or greater.  These 
findings underpin their basic thesis; that the rate of default is an important indicator for 
the likely average recovery rate among corporate bonds. Regarding the other univariate 
results, they all show the expected sign for each coefficient, but not all of the relationships 
are statistically significant. With very significant t-ratios, the 1-year change in BDR (BDRC) 
is, as expected, highly negatively correlated with recovery rates, however, the t-ratios and 
R2 values are not as significant as those for the logarithm of the bond default rate (BLDR). 
As they expected, both the supply (BOA) and demand (BDA) variables are negatively 
correlated with the recovery rate, with BDA being most significant. Test results regarding 
the macroeconomic variables, show that these variables do not explain as much of the 
variation in recovery rates as the corporate bond market variables. The weak performance 
of the macro variables, relative to the bond market variables, is further confirmed by the 
presence of some heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in the regression’s residuals, 
implying one or more omitted variables. 
3.5.2 FINDINGS - MULTIVARIATE MODELS 
Analyzing the correlation between the different variables Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005) 
find a relatively strong link8 between BDR and GDP, signifying that the default rate 
correlates with macro growth variables. Consequently, they expect that the significance of 
results will be blurred if the GDP variable is added to the BDR/BRR relationship. In their 
multivariate- linear and loglinear regression analysis they find that the basic structure 
(regression 1-6, appendix 2) of their most successful models is  
                           
                                                        
8 Correlation, between GDP and BDR between 1982-2001, of -.56 
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They find that the model with the highest explanatory power and the lowest "error" is the 
power model (regression 4, appendix 2) with the following structure: 
                                
Giving the following structure for the BRR: 
                
                       
In this model all variables show the expected sign, and are significant at the 5-and 1 
percent level, with BLDR and BDRC being the most significant variables, explaining more 
than 78 percent (adjusted R2) of the variation in the BRR, showing that level and change in 
defaults are very important explanatory variables for recovery rates. The explanatory 
power of the model increases by 6-7 percent by adding the BOA variable, measuring the 
size of the speculative grade bond market. By replacing the BDA with the BOA (regression 
5 and 6, appendix 2) they find that the explanatory power of the model weakens, however, 
they point out that the expected sign is correct and that BDA is more significant than the 
BOA in the univariate basis (regression 7-10, appendix 2). 
 
Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005) are rather surprised by the low contribution from the 
macro variables (regression 7-10, appendix 2). When they including the GDP variable to 
the existing multivariate structures (regression 7 and 8, appendix 2) they find that it is not 
significant and does not show the expected sign. Subsequently, they argue that the GDPC 
variable, although not reported, leads to similar results as the GDP measure. They state 
that the strong negative correlation between the BDR and the GDP variables reduces the 
possibility of including both variables in the multivariate structure.  
 
To account for the fact that the BRR is bounded between zero and one, they include logistic 
regressions to their multivariate analysis (regression 11-15, appendix 2). Results from the 
logistic regression models are similar to existing models, measured by R2 and t-ratios.  
3.6 ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005) perform various robustness checks with the aim at 
verifying how results change given different modifications to their approach.  
Since one may argue that models based on an ex-post analysis of default rates are 
conceptually different from an ex-ante (probabilities of default) analysis of default rates, 
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they analyze the validity of their results given an ex ante estimate of the default rate. They 
find that both specifications are of importance for different purposes, but argue that 
applying an ex-ante default probability in a regression analysis of recovery rates may be 
limited by the bias and the empirical evidence the ex-ante default probabilities are 
estimated from. Assessing the relationship between ex-ante default probabilities and 
recovery rates (BRR) by utilizing global issuer-based default probabilities generated by 
Moody's, they find that the ex-ante specification is significantly negative correlated with 
recovery rates,  although the explanatory power is considerably lower compared to their 
multivariate models, all variables show the expected sign.  
 
Given that annual data is applied in their main analysis, they utilize quarterly observations 
to analyze whether higher frequency data also confirms the existence of a link between 
default and recovery rates. On a univariate basis they find that the BDR still has the correct 
sign and is strongly significant, however, the explanatory power of the quarterly data is 
lower relative to the annual (R2 drops from 23.9% to 51.4%). Arguing that the fall in the 
explanatory power is due to quarterly data being more volatile, they estimate a new model 
based on a four quarter moving average issuer weighted recovery rate (BRR4W) and the 
bond default rate (BDR), its lagged value (BDR-1) and its square (BDR0.5). This model gives 
a much better R2 (72.4%) and show that the association between default and recovery 
rates are rather "sticky". 
 
Based on the logic that risk-free rates are fundamental in the pricing of bonds, they include 
an analysis of the association between the risk-free rate and the recovery rate. This 
analysis is conducted by adding the 1-year and 10-year U.S. Treasury rates, as well as the 
spread9 between them to their best performing models. They find the results from this 
analysis as disappointing, given that none of these variables ever is statistically significant 
at the 10% level. 
With the aim at analyzing how the "equilibrium price" is influenced by a possible link 
between the return experienced in the defaulted bond market and the demand for 
distressed securities, Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005) include a variable measuring the 1-
                                                        
9 Difference between 10-year and 1-year U.S. Treasury rate 
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year return on the Altman-NYU Salomon Center Index of Defaulted Bonds (BIR) to their 
univariate and multivariate models. On a univariate basis they find that the BIR shows the 
expected sign and explains around 35 percent of the variation in the recovery rate. 
Including the BIR in their multivariate models gives the expected signs. However, the 
significance is usually under 10 percent.   
 
Attempting to circumvent the problem that the GDP growth variable lacks statistical 
significance and shows a counterintuitive sign in the multivariate models, Altman, Resti 
and Sironi (2005) includes a dummy variable for GDP growth variable. This dummy 
variable, GDPI, takes the value of 1 when the GDP grows at less than 1.5 percent and 0 
otherwise. In the univariate analysis the GDPI variable shows a significant relationship 
with the expected sign. When including the variable in the multivariate analysis it shows 
the right sign, however, the tests show no statistical significance. To check whether the 
state of the economy cause a structural change in the relationship between default and 
recovery rates, they remove recession10 years from their analysis. Results from this 
analysis, however not reported, confirm their basic models findings (regression 1-4, 
appendix 2), and suggest that their findings is not affected by recessions. 
 
Lastly, they consider recovery rates broken down by the original bond- rating and 
seniority. They find that the link between default and recovery rates stay statistically 
significant in all cases; however, showing a weaker link for junk issues and subordinate 
bonds. They suggest that the reason why investment grade and senior class bonds shows a 
stronger link may be because these defaults are generally larger and are therefore causing 
asset prices to fall, which again  causes recovery rates to fall. 
3.7 CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FROM FINDINGS 
As stated in the literature review, Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005) conclude that there 
exists a strong and significant negative correlation between default and recovery rates. 
Based on results from their univariate and multivariate regression models, they also 
conclude that the supply of defaulted bonds (BOA) explains a substantial portion of the 
variance in aggregate bond recovery rates.  
                                                        
10 Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005) defines it as "years showing a negative real GDP growth rate"  
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Additionally they address the implications the presence of a significant and negative 
correlation between default and recovery rates has for both VaR models and the 
procyclicality of capital requirements. First, given that most credit VaR models keep the 
recovery rate independent from the default probabilities; they compare the performance 
of two credit VaR models11 both with and without the negative and stochastic correlation 
between recovery rates and default probabilities. Results indicate that credit VaR models 
vastly understates both the expected and unexpected losses if one assumes no relationship 
between default probabilities and default rates. Based on these findings they reason that 
neglecting this negative correlation might result in unnecessary shocks to financial 
markets as the expected losses on bank reserves are systematically misjudged. Lastly, they 
address the implications their findings have on procyclicality capital requirements, such as 
the internal ratings-based (IRB) proposed by the Basel Committee. They reason that the 
negative link between default and recovery rates might amplify cyclical effects, since 
periods of economic stress would cause default rates to increase which again would cause 
recovery rates to decrease resulting in higher credit losses. As a consequent capital 
requirements would increase causing the supply of bank credit to the economy to 
decrease, resulting in an amplification of the recession. Addressing that these same 
mechanisms also are at place when the economy is booming, they find that, although the 
use of the long-term average recovery rates would lower the cyclicality effect on IRB 
requirements, it would on the other hand cause that banks maintained a less updated 
picture of their risk, and as a result trade precision for stability. 
  
                                                        
11 CREDITRISK+® and CreditMetrics® 
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4. MY APPROACH – A GLOBAL STUDY 
In this section I will present the data, definitions and explanatory variables applied in the 
global study of the link between default and recovery rates.  Differences in methodology, 
data and definition will be addressed. I have analyzed to different samples sizes in order to 
make results more robust and to analyze to what extent results vary over time. Sample 1 
has the same time frame as in the U.S. study (1982-2001), while sample 2 includes the 
most recent observations (1982-2012). In the succeeding sections the study performed by 
Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005) is also referred to as the U.S. study.  
4.1 DATA 
 
FIGURE 1 – GLOBAL DISTRIBUTION OF DEFAULTS 
This thesis relies on several data sources that I combine to analyze recovery rates in the 
global corporate bond market. Data on defaults and recoveries is collected from Moody's 
annual report12 on corporate default and recovery rates. In their annual study Moody's 
update statistics on defaults, credit loss, and rating transition experience for most the 
current year, in this case 2012, as well as for the historical period since 1920. In Moody's 
dataset the North American share global corporate bond defaults averages approximately 
87% percent. This means that there, by construction, are some correlation between 
Moody's global dataset and the U.S. dataset applied by Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005)13.  
                                                        
12 Annual Default Study: Corporate Default and Recovery Rates, 1920-2012 
13 The Altman-NYU Salomon Center Corporate Bond Default Master Database 
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In the table above the correlation between the global data set, provided by Moody's, and 
the U.S. data set, applied in Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005), is compared. From the 
correlation matrix we get that the correlation between the main variables in the two 
datasets is quite strong for all variables. One reason why the correlation between the two 
BDRC variables is relatively lower may be that the BDRC in the global dataset is set to zero 
in 1982.  The correlation between the two recovery rates (BRR) is, relative to the 
correlation between the other variables, the weakest one. A reason for this relatively weak 
correlation may be that the BRR is volume weighted in Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005) 
while it is issuer-weighted in Moody's publication. Although the BRR is obtained using 
different weights, the 20 year average BRR is the same, approximately 42 percent, in both 
samples. 
 
BRR BLRR BDR BLDR BDRC BOA BDA
BRR .81 0.84 -0.77 -0.78 -0.67 -0.58 -0.79
BLRR 0.8 .84 -0.78 -0.78 -0.67 -0.6 -0.84
BDR -0.71 -0.75 .93 0.88 0.61 0.46 0.86
BLDR -0.78 -0.79 0.88 .90 0.58 0.45 0.75
BDRC -0.64 -0.66 0.51 0.49 .83 0.52 0.7
BOA -0.48 -0.54 0.38 0.43 0.26 .90 0.76
BDA -0.61 -0.66 0.7 0.66 0.49 0.73 .99
NOTE: Altman=>Column, Moody's=>Row. Number of Obs. 20.
CORRELATION BETWEEN U.S. AND GLOBAL DATA SETS, 1982-2001
BDR BOA BDA GDP SR BRR
BDR 1.00 .33 .73 -.56 -.30 -.72
BOA 1.00 .76 .05 -.21 -.53
BDA 1.00 -.26 -.49 -.64
GDP 1.00 -.02 .29
SR 1.00 .26
BRR 1.00
      NOTE.- The table shows the correlation between the different U.S. variables. Values greater 
than .5 are italicized. Number of observations is 20. Values from Altman et al. (2005)
CORRELATION AMONG MAIN VARIABLES - U.S. DATA SET, 1982-2001
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Comparing the correlation among the main variables in the two datasets, given an 
identical time-span of 20 years (1982-2001), shows that the correlations are quite similar, 
with the same sign in all cases, except for the correlation between GDP and MSCIW. All in 
all, the variables tend to correlate stronger in the global analysis.  
 
The BRR and BDR show approximately the same correlation when variables are based on 
the U.S. and second global sample, while this correlation is surprisingly high in sample 1. 
Contrary to correlations in sample 1 and the U.S study, the BOA variable in sample 2 shows 
a counterintuitive correlation with the BOA, GDP and BRR variable. In sample 2, BRR 
correlates quite strongly with GDP. In both global samples the performance of the stock 
market (MSCIW) correlates quite strongly with the BRR.  
  
BDR BOA BDA GDP MSCIW BRR
BDR 1.00 .44 .85 -.35 -.60 -.87
BOA 1.00 .74 .07 -.29 -.46
BDA 1.00 -.19 -.55 -.75
GDP 1.00 .14 .18
MSCIW 1.00 .58
BRR 1.00
      NOTE.- The table shows the correlation between the different variables. Values greater than 
.5 are italicized. Number of observations is 20.
CORRELATION AMONG MAIN VARIABLES - GLOBAL DATA SET, 1982-2001
BDR BOA BDA GDP MSCIW BRR
BDR 1.00 -.02 .84 -.56 -.37 -.71
BOA 1.00 .37 -.09 -.20 .20
BDA 1.00 -.64 -.30 -.46
GDP 1.00 .09 .41
MSCIW 1.00 .40
BRR 1.00
CORRELATION AMONG MAIN VARIABLES - GLOBAL DATA SET, 1982-2012
      NOTE.- The table shows the correlation between the different variables. Values greater than .5 are italicized. 
Number of observations is 20.
27 
 
4.2 DEPENDENT AND EXPLANATORY VARIABLES IN GLOBAL STUDY 
In the following section, a detailed overview of all the variables included in the analysis as 
well as a clarification on how they may differ with the ones applied in Altman, Resti and 
Sironi (2005), is presented. The explanatory variables BLDR, BLRR, GDPC and MSCIWC are 
not given a detailed description since they, by construction are, identical to the ones 
applied in the U.S. study. Both the dependent and the independent variables are expected 
to have the same sign as in the U.S. study. 
4.2.1 DEPENDENT VARIABLE – THE RECOVERY RATE (BRR & BLRR) 
     ∑
                           
                            
 
   
 
 
 
                 
The aggregate annual global recovery rate is measured as the issuer-weighted (N) 
recovery on all corporate bonds defaults covered by Moody's. Moody's database14 
comprises more than 5100 observation on recovery rates. The bond recovery rate is 
measured as the "bid" quote 30 days after default. In their study15 of trading prices as 
predictors of ultimate corporate bond and loan recovery rates, Moody's find that 
ultimate16 recoveries on average are 3 percent higher than the trading-price-based 
recovery rates, with highest and most significant difference for senior secured bonds and 
loans. Despite the difference between ultimate and trading-price-based recovery rates, 
Moody's argue that trading price closely tracks average ultimate recovery over time.  
4.2.1.1 DIFFERENCE IN METHODOLOGY 
While Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005) use the "bid" level on, or as close to, the default date 
as possible, as the recovery rate, Moody's find that "bid" prices 30 days after default 
explain more of the variation in ultimate recoveries, since there are more observations 
available after 30 days, compared to prices closer to default. In the global study the 
weights for the annual aggregate recovery rate is issuer based, while it is value based in 
the U.S. study. However, it is not believed that this will weaken the study, as value- and 
issuer based weights are quite similar over time17.  
                                                        
14 See Appendix 6 for more on Moody's database on defaults 
15 Moody’s Investors Service, “Trading Prices as Predictors of Ultimate Corporate Recovery Rates", New 
York: Moody’s, 2012 
16 The ultimate recovery rate is a realization of the recovery rate once a company emerges from bankruptcy 
17 Moody’s Investors Service, "Moody's Dollar Volume-Weighted Default Rates" ", New York: Moody’s, 2003 
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4.3 EXPLANATORY VARIABLES  
4.3.1 – THE DEFAULT RATE (BDR & BLDR) 
"A debt instrument can experience a loss only if there has been a default" Schuermann 
(2004).  Banks, corporations, legislators, investors and credit rating agencies etc. often use 
different definitions of what constitutes a default. There is no standard definition of what 
constitutes a default, and different definitions may be used for different purposes.   
Moody's definition of default consists of four types of credit events18: 
1. "missed or delayed disbursement of a contractually-obligated interest or principal 
payment (excluding missed payments cured within a contractually allowed grace 
period), as defined in credit agreements and indentures; 
2. a bankruptcy filing or legal receivership by the debt issuer or obligor that will likely 
cause a miss or delay in future contractually-obligated debt service payments; 
3. a distressed exchange whereby 1) an obligor offers creditors a new or restructured 
debt, or a new package of securities, cash or assets that amount to a diminished 
financial obligation relative to the original obligation and 2) the exchange has the 
effect of allowing the obligor to avoid a bankruptcy or payment default in the 
future; or 
4. a change in the payment terms of a credit agreement or indenture imposed by the 
sovereign that results in a diminished financial obligation, such as a forced currency 
re-denomination (imposed by the debtor, himself, or his sovereign) or a forced 
change in some other aspect of the original promise, such as indexation or maturity. 
Bond defaults is in the NYU Salomon Center database applied by Altman, Resti and 
Sironi (2005) is defined as: "bond issues that have missed a payment of interest and this 
delinquency is not cured within the “grace-period” (usually 30 days), or the firm has filed 
for bankruptcy under reorganization (Chapter 11) or liquidation (Chapter 7), or there is an 
announcement of a distressed restructuring. The latter typically involves a tender for an 
equity for debt swap, where the creditors accept a lower-priority security in-lieu of the 
bond (usually common equity), or a lower coupon rate payment or an extension to repay 
the bond is proposed."19 
                                                        
18 Moody’s Investors Service, “Moody’s rating symbols and definition,” New York: Moody’s, 2014 
19Edward Altman, "About Corporate Default Rates"  
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Although Moody's definition is more thorough, the two definitions of defaults are quite 
similar. The correlation between default rates in the U.S. and the global data-set is high 
(0.93) and potential differences are not believed to impose any weaknesses to the analysis. 
The BDR variable applied in the global study is measured as the annual aggregate default 
rate in the speculative grade bond segment, as defined by Moody's. The BDR is, as in 
Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005), volume weighted. Prior to 1994 Moody's did not report 
volume-weighted default rates, so the BDR's from 1982 till 1993 is gathered from a 
revision of volume-weighted default rate published by Moody's20. Mathematically, Moody’s 
12-month trailing speculative bond default rates are calculated as: 
     
∑   
  
     
     
  
                                                          
From the formula above we have that the BDRT for the 12-months ending at time t is the 
sum of the monthly defaulted bonds measured at face value and defined by rating i, in this 
case the speculative or high yield bond segment, divided by dollar volume, also measured 
at face, of bonds outstanding at the beginning of that 12-month period. The BDRC is 
defined as the one year change in the default rate (BDRCT=BDRT- BDRT-1). 
 
FIGURE 2 – U.S. AND GLOBAL DEFAULT RATES 
                                                        
20 Moody’s Investors Service, "Moody's Dollar Volume-Weighted Default Rates" ", New York: Moody’s, 2003 
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4.3.1.1 DIFFERENCE IN METHODOLOGY 
In the global study the annual aggregate default rate is weighted by the dollar amount of 
bonds outstanding at the beginning of the period, while it is weighted by the dollar amount 
outstanding mid-year in Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005). The correlation between the two 
BDR's is high, and this difference in methodology is not believed to weaken the analysis.  
4.3.2 TOTAL AMOUNT OF DEFAULTED BONDS (BDA) 
The annual total dollar par-value of defaulted corporate bonds in the global speculative 
grade bond market (BDA) is gathered from Moody's report - Annual Default Study: 
Corporate Default and Recovery Rates, 1920-2012. For the same reasons as in Altman, 
Resti and Sironi (2005), the Texaco's 1987 default21  is excluded22. 
 
FIGURE 3 – HISTORIC PAR VALUE OF CORPORATE BOND DEFAULTS 
4.3.2.1 DIFFERENCE IN METHODOLOGY 
There are no differences other than what might comprise or define a bond default. 
Obviously there are bond defaults in the global speculative market which is not recorded 
in Moody's dataset. The correlation between the U.S. and the global BDA variable is very 
high (.99). 
                                                        
21 1,841.7 mUSD – Altman & Kishore (1994) – "Defaults and Returns on High Yield Bonds – Through 1994" 
22 The default was motivated by a lawsuit which was considered frivolous, resulting in a strategic bankruptcy 
filing and a recovery rate (price at default) of over 80%.(Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005)) 
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4.3.3 TOTAL AMOUNT OF BONDS OUTSTANDING (BOA) 
Obtaining a reliable measure of the global amount of bonds outstanding in the speculative 
grade segment proved to be a difficult task. Consequently, the BOA is estimated by dividing 
the dollar amount of default bonds23 in the speculative bond market (BDA) on the 
previously described global bond default rate (BDR).. 
 
FIGURE 4 – PAR VALUE OF CORPORATE BONDS OUTSTANDING 
4.3.3.1 DIFFERENCE IN METHODOLOGY  
While the BOA in Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005) is measured mid-year and excludes 
defaulted issues, the BOA in the global analysis is an approximation based on a default rate 
weighted by the year start face amount of outstanding corporate bonds in the speculative 
market. 
     
    
∑   
  
     
     
  
⁄
                                       
Furthermore, the BOA variable applied in the global analysis does not exclude defaulted 
issues. Even though the global BOA variable is somewhat different by construction, the U.S. 
and the global BOA variable are surprisingly highly correlated (.90), indicating that the 
estimation may be satisfactory.  
                                                        
23 Reported in Moody's report - Annual Default Study: Corporate Default and Recovery Rates, 1920-2012 
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4.3.4 GDP GROWTH RATE AND RELATED VARIABLES (GDP, GDPC & GDPI) 
The world GDP growth rate has been selected as the GDP variable in the global analysis. 
This rate is collected from The World Bank24, and is the dollar denominated annual rate 
based on constant 2005 U.S. dollars. The GDPC is the yearly change in the GDP growth rate. 
The GDPI is a dummy variable, with the aim at measuring if the economy is in a recession 
or not. The variable takes the value of 1 if the economy is in a recession and 0 otherwise. 
 
FIGURE 5 – ANNUAL CHANGE IN U.S. AND GLOBAL GDP 
4.3.4.1 DIFFERENCE IN METHODOLOGY 
To better reflect when the global economy is in a downturn the threshold for when the 
GDPI dummy variable takes the value of 1 has been increased from 1.5 percent in the U.S. 
analysis till 3.0 in the global analysis. This is since the International Monetary Fund 
considers a global recession as a period where gross domestic product (GDP) growth is at 
3% or less25. 
  
                                                        
24 For methodology: http://data.worldbank.org/about/data-overview/methodologies  
25Definition from Investopedia:  http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/global-recession.asp 
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4.3.5 THE RETURN IN THE STOCK MARKET (MSCIW & MSCIWC) 
In the global study the annual return on the MSCI World Index (MSCIW) has been selected 
as the variable measuring the performance of the global stock market. The MSCIW 
measures the total return, gross dividend taxes, of 2326 developed country stock indices. 
The MSCIWC variable measures the yearly change in the MSCIW. 
 
FIGURE 6 – PERFORMANCE OF THE U.S. AND GLOBAL STOCK MARKET 
4.3.5.1 DIFFERENCE IN METHODOLOGY 
There are no apparent differences between the two variables, other than what they 
measure. Although the MSCIW does not include all countries, it is believed that it is a good 
indicator for the performance of the global stock market. As assumed, the correlation 
between the two indices is high (.86), as the U.S. stock market is the largest market in the 
world measured by the market capitalization27, and therefore, by construction, highly 
affects the fluctuation in the MSCIW.  
                                                        
26 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States 
27 http://www.world-exchanges.org/ 
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5. FINDINGS FROM THE GLOBAL STUDY 
In the following section findings from the global study of the link between default and 
recovery rates is presented. The univariate and multivariate regressions discussed, is 
calculated using both the recovery rate (BRR) and its natural logarithm (BLRR) as 
dependent variables. In the tables summarizing the regressions the dependent variable is 
signified with an X in the corresponding row. As this thesis aims at testing the findings in 
Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005), the same statistical methods and goodness of fit measures 
are applied in order to make results as directly comparable as possible. I have not included 
a discussion or presentation of the statistical methods applied; however, I have included a 
brief presentation of the different goodness of fit measures used to determine the best 
models.  
 
The statistical regression models applied in this thesis has been obtained by, first, writing 
a statistical script that reproduces the findings in Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005), and 
then rewriting this script for the global data (unreported). Obtaining the same results as in 
the U.S. study, makes me confident that the statistical methods and goodness of fit 
measures applied in the global study align with the statistical methods and goodness of fit 
measures applied in Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005). 
 
The first sample analyzed has the same time-span as in the U.S. study, comprise 20 
observations and contain data ranging from 1982 until 2001 (denoted "sample 1"). The 
second sample analyzed comprises 31 observations and contains data ranging from 1982 
until 2012 (denoted "sample 2).  
5.1 GOODNESS OF FIT MEASURES 
5.1.1 T-RATIO 
The t-ratio is the estimated regression line coefficient divided by the standard error. A 
large t-ratio indicates that it is unlikely that estimates are obtained due to sampling error. 
As a rule of thumb, a t-value higher than two is a good indicator of significance for a test at 
the 5 % significance level. The t-ratio is an important measure in order to validate whether 
a regression variable has any significant explanatory contribution to the regression model.  
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5.1.2 COEFFICIENT OF DETERMINATION ( R2) 
R2 is often referred to as the amount of variability in the data accounted for or explained 
by the regression model, and is therefore often used to judge the adequacy of a regression 
model. A R2 close to one indicates that the independent variable/-s explain a high degree 
of the variation in the dependent variable. Since R2 increases as more variables are added 
to the regression model, it can be difficult to know if the increase is telling us anything 
useful. Consequently, the adjusted R2 is applied as it only increases if the variable added 
reduces the error mean square.    
5.1.3 F-STATISTICS 
The F-ratio and its exceedance probability is used to determine if the residual sum of 
squares is significantly less than the total sum of squares. Although R2 tells us how much 
better a model with independent variables explains observed data, we do not know if the 
model with independent variables is significantly better. Therefor the F-ratio and its 
exceedance probability are used to test the significance of all the independent variables 
taken together. An exceedance probability close to zero indicates that the model is 
significant. In a simple univariate regression model the F-ratio equals the square of the t-
ratio of the independent variable.  
5.1.4 SERRIAL CORRELATION (BREUSCH-GODFREY LM TEST) 
The Breusch-Godfrey LM test is applied to validate the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation within the regression model. Large test values, with probability close or 
equal to zero, indicate that there exists higher-order autocorrelation within the regression 
model. Consequently, the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation should be discarded. In this 
thesis, as in Altman et al (2005), the lag is of second-order. 
5.1.5 HETEROSCEDASTICITY (WHITE'S TEST) 
White's test is used to examine the characteristics of the regression residual variance, and 
consequently to determine the presence of heteroscedasticity. The null hypothesis is that 
the regression residuals are homoscedastic. The closer the p-value is to zero, the more 
likely it is that heteroscedasticity is present, and consequently the null hypothesis of 
constant variance in regression residuals is rejected. 
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5.2 RESULTS FROM THE GLOBAL STUDY – SAMPLE 1 (1982-2001) 
5.2.1 RESULTS FROM UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
Results from the univariate regression analysis are presented in table 1A and B, where 
table A summarizes the performance of the market variables, and B the macro variables. 
 
FIGURE 7- LINK BETWEEN BDR/BLDR AND BRR/BLRR, (1982-2001)  
As expected there exists a strong and significant link between default rates and recovery 
rates for the period 1982-2001. The linear model (presented in regression 1 in table 1A) 
show that the default rate explains around 75 percent of the annual variation in recovery 
rates, while the power and logarithmic models (presented in regression 3 and 4) explain 
as much as 80 percent of the variation in the annual recovery rate. All the coefficients in 
regressions 1 through 4 are significant at the 1 percent level, there are some 
heteroscedasticity, though not significant given an alpha of 5 percent, and consequently 
the null hypothesis of constant variance is accepted. Also, the Breuch-Godfrey test shows 
there are no significant serial correlation in these first four regressions. Thus, the basic 
thesis in Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005) that default rates are an important indicator of 
the likely annual recovery rates is backed by the global analysis.  
The remaining market variables (regression 5 through 10) all show the expected sign for 
each coefficient; however, the relationship between the dollar amount of bonds 
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outstanding (BOA) and the recovery rate (BRR), (regression 7 and 8), is not significant as 
the p-value from the F-statistics is greater than the 1 percent threshold. Also, the Breuch-
Godfrey test shows that there is a significant amount of serial correlation in the regression 
residuals in regression 7 and 8. The link between the total annual dollar amount of bond 
defaults (BDA) and the recovery rate (BRR), (regression 9 and 10), is stronger than 
expected, with annual BDA explaining more than 60 percent of the annual variation in 
BRR.  
Although all the macro variables show the expected sign for each coefficient, regression 
results (presented in Table 1 B) show that these variables explain less of the variation in 
the recovery rate compared to the market variables. The annual performance of the global 
stock market (MSCIW), (regression 17 and 18), is the only macro variable which is 
significant at the 1 percent level, and surprisingly explains almost 40% percent of the 
annual variation in the recovery rate.     
5.2.2 RESULTS FROM MULTIVARIATE AND LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Results from the multivariate regression analysis is presented in table 2A and B, where 
table A summarizes the regression variables, the coefficients and the respective t-ratios, 
and table B summarizes the performance of each multivariate regression model. 
Regression 11 through 15 is logistic regression models with Gaussian family and with a 
logit identity. The logistic regression modes are, as in Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005), 
included in the analysis to account for the fact that the recovery rate is bound between 
zero and 1. 
 
The six first multivariate regressions are based on the market variables. Results show that 
these models explain as much as 81 percent (adjusted R2, regression 6) of the variation in 
recovery rates, and all variables, except the BDA variable in regression 5, show the 
expected sign. The BDR and BLDR are significant at the 1 percent level in all these 
regressions. However, the BDRC, BOA and BDA are not significant at the 10 percent level 
or less based on their t-ratios.  These models also show some signs of heteroscedasticity, 
though not significant given an alpha of 5 percent. 
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In regression 7 through 10, macro variables are added to the basic multivariate regression 
models (regression 1 through 4). As in the basic models the BDR and BLDR are significant 
at the 1 percent level, and all coefficients show the expected sign. The best performing 
model explains as much as 83 percent of the variation in recovery rates, and is obtained 
when the MSCIW is included to the basic structure (regression 10). In this model the BDRC 
and MSCIW is significant at the 10 percent level. The GDP variable gives no significant 
contribution to the existing multivariate structures, and does not show the expected sign 
(regression 7 and 8). The logistic regressions (regression 11 through 15), gives similar 
results as the linear and log models, with the BDR being the only significant variable. 
5.2.2.1 ADDITIONAL REGRESSION 
Given the significant and strong univariate relationship between the amount of bonds 
outstanding and the recovery rate found in the univariate analysis (table 1A, regression 9 
and 10), I ran a multivariate regression with BLDR and BDA as dependent variables. 
Results from this regression-model are summarized below, and show that by including the 
BDA variable, the explanatory power significantly increases with around 4-8 percent 
(measured by the adjusted R2) compared with the univariate relationship between default 
and recovery rate (regression 1-4, table 1 A). 
 
Call:
lm(formula = BLRR ~ BLDR + BDA)
Residuals:
     Min       1Q   Median       3Q      Max 
-0.24167 -0.03259 -0.01363  0.04777  0.18426 
Coefficients:
            Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept) -1.59546    0.16815  -9.488 3.32e-08 ***
BLDR        -0.20264    0.04433  -4.571 0.000272 ***
BDA         -4.59702    1.89984  -2.420 0.027027 *  
---
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Residual standard error: 0.1018 on 17 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.8364,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.8172 
F-statistic: 43.47 on 2 and 17 DF,  p-value: 2.071e-07 
Serrial correlation LM, 2 lags (Breusch-Godfrey) 3.345
(p-value) 0.188
Heteroscedasticity (White, Chi square) 6.617
(p-value) 0.158
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TABLE 1 A - UNIVARIATE REGRESSIONS, 1982-2001, MARKET VARIABLES 
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TABLE 1 B - UNIVARIATE REGRESSIONS, 1982-2012, MACRO VARIABLES 
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TABLE 2 A - MULTIVARIATE REGRESSIONS, 1982-2001 
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TABLE 2 B - GOODNESS OF FIT MEASURES, 1982-2001  
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5.3 RESULTS FROM THE GLOBAL STUDY – SAMPLE 2 (1982-2012) 
5.3.1 RESULTS FROM UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS, 1982 - 2012 
Results from the univariate regression analysis are presented in table 3A and B, where 
table A summarizes the performance of the market variables, and B the macro variables. 
 
FIGURE 8 - LINK BETWEEN BDR/BLDR AND BRR/BLRR, (1982-2012) 
Univariate regression results based on sample 2 shows that the BDR and BLDR (regression 
1 through 4) explains 50 to 66 percent of the annual variation in recovery rates. Even 
though these regressions are significant at the 1 percent level, the Breusch-Godfrey test 
indicates that there is a significant (alpha of 5 percent) amount of serial correlation in the 
regression residuals. This is however the case in all the univariate regression models. The 
amount of bonds outstanding (BOA), unexpectedly, show the wrong sign, and almost no 
explainable power, the BDA  on the other hand explains up to 20 percent of the variation in 
recovery rates, and is significant at the 1 percent level.  
The macro variables perform surprisingly well, with regression 11 through 18 being 
significant at the 5 percent level. On a univariate basis both recessions (GDPI) and the 
performance of the global stock market (MSCIW) explains around 20 percent (regression 
15 and 18) of the annual variation in recovery rates. With exception of regression 19 all 
the macro variables show the excepted sign.  
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5.3.2 RESULTS FROM MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS - 1982 - 2012 
Results from the multivariate regression analysis are presented in table 4 A and B, where 
table A summarizes the regression variables, the coefficients and the respective t-ratios, 
and table B summarizes the performance of each multivariate regression model.  
 
In the extended sample there is a positive correlation between BOA and the recovery rate. 
This is reflected in the multivariate analysis, where the coefficient for the BOA variable 
counterintuitively shows a positive sign in all models. The six first multivariate regression 
models are based on the market variables. Results show that these variables explain as 
much as 68 percent (adjusted R2, regression 6) of the variation in recovery rates, and all 
variables, except the BOA, show the expected sign. The BDR and BLDR are significant at 
the 1 percent level in all these regressions. However, the BDRC and BOA are not significant 
at the 10 percent level, or less, based on their t-ratios. These models show some signs of 
heteroscedasticity, with the heteroscedasticity being significant, given an alpha of 5 
percent in regression 1 and 2. In regression 5 and 6 the BDA variable is added to the basic 
model, with regression 5 nearly being significant at the 5 percent level, and regression 6 
almost being significant at the 10 percent level. Regression 6 is the model with the highest 
explanatory power and greatest F-statistics, with almost all coefficients significant at the 
10 percent level, and with no significant serial correlation or heteroscedasticity.   
 
In regression 7 through 10, macro variables are added to the basic multivariate regression 
models (regression 1 through 4). As in the basic models the BDR and BLDR are significant 
at the 1 percent level, and all coefficients show the expected sign. The best performing 
model explains as much as 68 percent (adjusted R2) of the variation in recovery rates, and 
is obtained when the MSCIW is included to the basic structure (regression 10). However, 
in this model only the constant term and BLDR show significant coefficients. The GDP 
variable gives no significant contribution to the existing multivariate structures, and does 
not show the expected sign in regression 8. The logistic regressions (regression 11 
through 15) explain less of the annual variation in recovery rates in comparison to the 
multivariate linear and log models. 
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5.3.3.1 ADDITIONAL REGRESSION 
Applying the extended dataset and running the same model as in section 5.2.2.1 gives the 
following results: 
 
Adding the BDA variable slightly increases the explanatory power. However, the BDA 
variable is not significant and tests indicate that there is a significant amount of serial 
correlation and heteroscedasticity in regression residuals. 
  
Call:
lm(formula = BLRR ~ BLDR + BDA, data = THELINK)
Residuals:
     Min       1Q   Median       3Q      Max 
-0.32356 -0.06445 -0.01455  0.07606  0.36546 
Coefficients:
            Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept) -1.82318    0.16101 -11.324 5.78e-12 ***
BLDR        -0.26020    0.04107  -6.335 7.46e-07 ***
BDA          1.31945    1.10998   1.189    0.245    
---
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Residual standard error: 0.1432 on 28 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.683,      Adjusted R-squared: 0.6604 
F-statistic: 30.17 on 2 and 28 DF,  p-value: 1.034e-07 
Serrial correlation LM, 2 lags (Breusch-Godfrey) 6.819
(p-value) 0.033
Heteroscedasticity (White, Chi square) 3.677
(p-value) 0.004
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TABLE 3 A - UNIVARIATE REGRESSIONs, 1982-2012, MARKET VARIABLES  
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TABLE 3 B – UNIVARIATE REGRESSIONS, 1982-2012, MACRO VARIABLES  
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TABLE 4 A - MULTIVARIATE REGRESSIONS, 1982-2012 
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TABLE 4 B - GOODNESS OF FIT MEASURES, 1982-2012 
50 
 
6. COMAPRISON BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND U.S. FINDINGS 
In the following section results from the global study is compared with the findings in 
Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005). The univariate and multivariate regression results in 
Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005) is presented in appendix 1 A and B.  
6.1 UNIVARIATE MODELS 
6.1.1 SAMPLE 1, 1982-2001  
The results from the global study of the univariate relationship between the market 
variables (regression 1 through 10, table 1 A) and the recovery rate are surprisingly 
similar to the findings in the U.S. study. All the market based univariate regression models 
shows the expected and same sign as in the U.S. study, and is, with the exception of 
regression 7 and 8, significant at the 1 percent level. The natural logarithm of the annual 
default rates (BLDR) is, as in in U.S. study, the variable with the highest explanatory power 
(regression 3 and 4). While the BLDR explains 65 percent (R2) of the annual variation in 
recovery rates in the U.S. study, it explains around 80 percent in the global study. The 
macro variables (regression 11 through 20, table 3 B) show similar relationships with the 
BRR as in the U.S. study, with the same sign in all cases. Contrary to findings in the U.S. 
study, recessions (GDPI) show no explanatory power in the global study (regression 15 
and 16, table 1B). While the performance of the stock market show no explanatory power 
in the U.S. study, results from the global analysis shows that the performance of the stock 
market (regression 17 and 18, table 1B) explains around 39 percent of the variation in 
BRR. 
6.1.2 SAMPLE 2, 1982-2012 
Contrary to the U.S. study, almost all regression variables in the extended global study 
show a significant amount of serial correlation in regression residuals. Results from the 
global univariate relationship between the BDR and BLDR variable and the BRR 
(regression 1 through 4, table 3 A) is surprisingly similar to the findings in the U.S. study.  
In both studies these variables explain around 50 to 65 percent of the variation in annual 
recovery rates. Although significant at the 1 percent level, the BDRC explains about half of 
the variation in BRR compared to the findings in the U.S. study. Whereas the BOA variable 
significantly explains almost 33 percent (regression 8, appendix 1A) of the variation in 
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BRR in the U.S. study, it shows no explanatory power in the global study. When sample 2 is 
applied the BDA variable significantly explains around 20 percent of the annual variation 
in the recovery rate, under half of the R2 found in the U.S. study.  The macro variables 
(regression 11 through 20, table 3 B) perform similarly as in the U.S. study, with the same 
sign, except regression 19, in all cases. However, while the performance of the stock 
market (SR) and general economy (GDP) explains an insignificant and small portion of the 
variation in annual recovery rates in the U.S. study (regression 17 and 18, appendix 1B), 
results from the global study show that the GDP (regression 11 and 12, table 3 B) and 
stock market performance (regression 17 and 18, table 3 B) explains a significant part of 
the variation in recovery rates, with R2 of respectively .167 and .20. In the global study 
there is a significant amount of serial correlation in all regression residuals, whereas 
macro variables in the U.S. study show no significant serial correlation in regression 
residuals. 
6.2 MULTIVARIATE MODELS 
6.2.1 SAMPLE 1, 1982-2001 
Comparing the performance of the multivariate models in the U.S. study (regression 1 
through 15, appendix 2) with the performance of the multivariate models in the global 
study, show that the multivariate models in the latter study performs rather poorly. While 
the basic models (regression 1 through 4, appendix 2) in U.S. study shows significant 
coefficients and shows a significant increase in the explanatory power compared to the 
univariate modes, the basic models in the global study shows no significant increase in the 
explanatory power, with BDR and BLDR being the only significant variables. The GDP 
variable and the performance of the stock market (MSCIW and SR) give similar results in 
both studies and does not significantly explain any of the variation in recovery rates. The 
logistic models give similar results as the univariate models is both studies.  
6.2.2 SAMPLE 2, 1982-2012  
Contrary to results from the U.S. study, but in line with the findings from the multivariate 
regression analysis based on the sample 1 (table 3), the multivariate models based on 
sample 2 (table 4) also fails at significantly explaining an increased part of the annual 
variation in recovery rates. While the BOA variable performs quite well in the U.S. study, it 
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shows the wrong sign and no significant explanatory power in the extended global study. 
In the global analysis based on sample 2, the GDP variable and the performance of the 
stock market (MSCIW and SR) show no significant explanatory power and accordingly 
gives similar results as in the U.S. study. As in the U.S. study the logistic models does not 
contribute with any significant explanatory power. 
6.3 SUMMARY 
In line with results from the U.S. study, univariate regression results from both global 
samples show that the annual aggregate default rates has a significant and negative 
relationship with recovery rates (regression 1 through 4, table 1 and 2 a). While 
regression results from sample 1 show that the BOA variable has, as in the U.S. study, a 
significant and negative effect on recovery rates, regression results (regression 7 and 8, 
table 1 A)  from sample 2  show no such effects. Results from both global samples show, as 
in the U.S. study, that the annual amount of bond defaults (BDA) has a significant and 
negative impact on the recovery rate. Regarding the univariate models based macro 
variables, it is noteworthy that the GDP variable has a significant coefficient and explains 
around 16 percent of the variation in recovery (table 3B, regression 11 and 12). Contrary 
to findings in the U.S study, regression results from both global samples show that the 
performance of the stock market significantly explains up to 39 percent (R2, regression 18 
table 1B) of the variation in recovery rates. Univariate regression results from both global 
samples show that the MSCIW variable significantly explains more of the variation in 
recovery rates than the BOA variable.  
While the univariate models based on the global samples significantly support many of the 
findings in Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005), the multivariate models does, however, not 
support the findings. In the global study none of the multivariate regression models give 
results where all coefficients are significant. While the BDR and BLDR variables are 
significant in all cases, the BDRC, BDA and BOA variables show no significant explanatory 
power. As in the U.S. study, the macro variables do not add any significant explanatory 
power to the BDR and BRR relationship.  
While the additional multivariate regression model based on sample 1 (section 5.2.3.1), is 
in line with findings in the U.S. study, results from the additional multivariate regression 
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model based on sample 2 is however not in line with the U.S. study. Given the diverging 
results, it is difficult to conclude whether the BDA variable adds any explanatory power to 
the BDR and BRR relationship. 
7. ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
I did not perform a robustness test on the data frequency, as I did not manage to obtain 
higher-frequency data on default and recovery rates. However, all the different sample 
sizes and frames (regression 1-4, table 1A, 3A and appendix 3) show a negative and 
significant relationship between default and recovery rates.   
Since the BDA variable applied in the global sample only contains defaulted bonds in the 
speculative grade segment, I wanted to check whether the poor performance of the BDA 
variable was due to measurement error in supply of defaulted bonds. I therefore ran 
additional regressions applying a BDA variable that also included bond defaults in the 
investment grade segment. Regression results when the new BDA variable is applied show 
no significant contribution. The initial BDA variable shows almost a significant 
contribution, however showing a counterintuitive sign. 
 
TABLE 5- REGRESSAON WITH NEW BDA VARIABLE  
Dependent variable
Explanatory variables:
coef.  and (t-ratios)    
Constant .48 .484 .480
(27.988) (29.728) (28.43)
BDR -1.366 -1.952 -1.280
(-4.227) (-4.708) (-5.39)
BDA .001
(1.937)
BDA* .000
(.399)
Goodness of  fit measures
R² .503 .560 .501
Adjusted R² .468 .528 .483
F-statistic 14.194 17.792 29.07
(p-value) .000 .000 .000
N. of observations 31 31 31
NOTE: *Includes both investment and speculative grade bonds
Performance of the BDA and BDA* Variables
BRR BRR BRR
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To further examine the robustness of the negative relationship between default and 
recovery rates, I tested, as in the U.S. study, weather results would hold when recovery 
rates are broken down seniority. Results (present in table 5) from this test are similar as to 
those in the U.S. study, and confirm that secured bonds recover more than unsecured and 
subordinated bonds.  
 
TABLE 6 - BRR BROKEN DOWN BY SENIORITY 
 
TABLE 7 – PERFORMANCE OF THE GDPI VARIABLE 
 
Dependent variable
Explanatory variables:
coef.  and (t-ratios)    
Constant .654 .517 .44 .413
(19.89) (25.47) (18.91) (11.15)
BDR -1.531 -1.353 -1.302 -1.066
(-3.41) (-4.73) (-3.98) (-2.08)
Goodness of  fit measures
R² .301 .436 .353 .134
Adjusted R² .276 .416 .33 .103
F-statistic 11.648 22.387 15.804 4.315
(p-value) .002 .000 .000 .047
N. of observations 29 31 31 30
NOTE: *Year 1984 and 1993 not included since there are no recorded defaults these 
years. **Year 2007 not included since there are no recorded defaults this year
Data Broken Down by Seniority Status
RR on Sr. 
Sec. Bonds*
RR on Sr. 
Unsec. 
Bonds
RR on Sr. 
Sub. Bonds
RR on Sub. 
Bonds**
Dependent variable
Explanatory variables:
coef.  and (t-ratios)    
Constant .488 -1.648 .480 -1.677
(26.624) (-12.251) (28.43) (-16.00)
GDPI -.031 -.021
(-1.129) (-.352)
BDR -1.148 -1.280
(-4.357) (-5.39)
BLDR -.221 -.226
(-6.499) (-7.62)
Goodness of  fit measures
R² .522 .668 .501 .667
Adjusted R² .488 .645 .483 .656
F-statistic 15.31 28.23 29.07 58.09
(p-value) .000 .000 .000 .000
N. of observations 31 31 31 31
Performance of the GDPI Dummy Variable
BRR BLRR BRR BLRR
NOTE: The GDPI takes the value of 1 if the global GDP rate is 3% or less, and 0 otherwise.
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The GDPI variable has, as in the U.S. study, been added to the global analysis to account for 
the high correlation between the BDR and the GDP variable28. In regressions based on the 
first sample (1982-2001) the GDPI variable shows no significant relationship with the 
recovery rate. However, when the extended sample (1982-2012) is applied, the 
performance of the GDPI variable drastically increases (regression 15 and 16, table 1B), 
and shows both the correct sign and is significant at the 5 percent threshold. Results from 
the univariate analysis based on data over the past 20 years (1993-2012), supports these 
findings (regression 5 and 6, B. macro variables, appendix 3), and shows a strong link 
between the GDPI variable and the recovery rate. The effect of adding the GDPI variable to 
the BDR and BRR relationship is summarized in table 7. Results show that the GDPI 
variable gives no significant contribution to the BDR and BRR relationship. 
8. IMPLICATIONS  
A negative link between default and recovery rates has import implication for a number of 
credit-risk-related conceptual and practical areas29 (Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005)).  In 
this thesis I have not included a thorough analysis of the various implications findings 
from the global study may have on various credit-risk-related areas. In section 3.7 a 
summary of the key areas which Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005) argues can be 
significantly affected when one considers that default rates are negatively correlated with 
recovery rates is presented. For further discussions on the implications: see Altman et al. 
(2001), and Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005).  In general, evidence of a significant and 
negative relationship between global corporate bond default and recovery rates has 
important implications for all credit-risk-related models treating the recovery rate 
independent of default rates.    
9. WEAKNESSES 
The default and the recovery rate are calculated differently in the global study and U.S. 
study. This may cause that results are less comparable. There might be differences in the 
types of defaults included in the global analysis as data on defaults are defined by Moody's 
                                                        
28 -.56 in both the U.S. and the global study based on sample 2 
29 Appendix 5 gives an overview over how the recovery rate are treated in different credit risk models 
56 
 
and not by the NYU Salomon Center, which is applied in the U.S. study. Univariate 
regression results based on sample 2 shows a significant amount of serial correlation in 
regression residuals and violates the ordinary least squares assumption that the residuals 
are uncorrelated. Numerous corporate bond defaults is presumably omitted in the global 
analysis as the BDA mainly comprise Moody's rated or listed bonds, affecting both the 
annual aggregate default and recovery rate. This also affects the BOA, as this size is implied 
from the amount of bonds outstanding and the default rate.  
It was not possible to validate results in light of higher-frequency data, as it proved 
difficult obtaining data on quarterly or monthly default and recovery rates.  
10. CONCLUSION  
The global study supports the findings in Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005) of a significant 
and negative link between default and recovery rates. I find that global default rates 
explain 80 percent of the annual variation in associated recovery rates when results are 
based on the same sample size (1982-2001) as in the U.S. study, and around 66 percent 
when the sample also includes the most recent observations (1982-2012). Evidence of a 
negative relationship between default and recovery rates have important implications for 
credit-risk-related areas treating the important recovery rate independent from default 
rates. Results from the global study shows that the bond default rate, in comparison to the 
other variables, undoubtedly explains the highest degree of variation in recovery rates.  
Although default rates have the highest explanatory power in the global analysis, it is 
noteworthy that the performance of the global stock market explains as much as 39 
percent of the variation in recovery rates. Univariate regression results shows that the 
performance of the global stock market explains more of the annual variation associated in 
recovery rates than the BOA variable.  On a univariate basis the supply of defaulted 
securities significantly explains from 20 to 60 percent of the variation in global recovery 
rates, however, when added to the multivariate models, results are divergent and the 
supply of defaulted bonds show no significant explanatory contribution. The latter finding 
differs from results in Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005), where the multivariate regression 
models assign a key role to the supply of defaulted bonds. None of the multivariate models 
in the global study give results where all coefficients are significant.   
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APPENDIX 1A -UNIVARIATE RESULTS ALTMAN, RESTI AND SIRONI (2005) 
*Table is copied from: Journal of Business, 2005, vol. 78, no. 6, page 2212 
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APPENDIX 1B, UNIVARIATE RESULTS ALTMAN, RESTI AND SIRONI (2005) 
*Table is copied from: Journal of Business, 2005, vol. 78, no. 6, page 2213 
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APPENDIX 2, MULTIVARIATE RESULTS ALTMAN, RESTI AND SIRONI (2005) 
*Table is copied from: Journal of Business, 2005, vol. 78, no. 6, page 2216 and 2217    
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 APPENDIX 3, UNIVARIATE REGRESSIONS, 1993-2012 
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APPENDIX 4, MULTIVARIATE REGRESSIONS, 1993-2012 
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APPENDIX 5, TREATMENT OF LDG AND BDR IN CREDIT RISK MODELS 
*Table is copied from: Altman, Edward I., Andrea Resti, and AndreaSironi.2001, page 26. 
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APPENDIX 6 - MOODY’S BONDS AND LOANS DATABASE 
Moody’s database of corporate defaults covers more than 3,000 long-term bond and loan 
defaults by issuers both rated and non-rated by Moody’s. Additional data sources, such as 
Barclay’s Fixed Income Index data, supplemented Moody’s proprietary data in the 
construction of the aggregate dollar volume-weighted default rates. Defaulted bond pricing 
data was derived from Bloomberg, Reuters, IDC, and TRACE. The majority of these market 
quotes represent an actual bid on the debt instrument, although no trade may have occurred 
at that price. Over the 1982-2012 period, the dataset includes post-default prices for 
approximately 5,000 defaulted instruments issued by over 1,700 defaulting corporations.  
Source: 
Moody’s Investors Service, (2013), “Annual default study: corporate default and recovery 
rates, 1920-2012,” New York: Moody’s,  
https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_151031 
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APPENDIX 7 –VALUES IN THE GLOBAL STUDY 
 
 
 
  
YEAR BRR BLRR BDR BLDR BDRC  BOA BDA GDP GDPC GDPI MSCIW MSCIWC
1982 0,35 -1,04 0,06 -2,90 -     0,01 0,00 0,40   -1,66    1 0,11      0,15        
1983 0,45 -0,81 0,02 -4,07 -0,04 0,07 0,00 2,66   2,27     1 0,23      0,12        
1984 0,45 -0,79 0,02 -4,06 0,00   0,02 0,00 4,67   2,01     0 0,06      -0,18       
1985 0,44 -0,83 0,02 -3,75 0,01   0,06 0,00 3,81   -0,87    0 0,42      0,36        
1986 0,47 -0,75 0,02 -4,14 -0,01 0,25 0,00 3,25   -0,56    0 0,43      0,01        
1987 0,51 -0,67 0,01 -4,42 -0,00 0,27 0,00 3,51   0,27     0 0,17      -0,26       
1988 0,39 -0,95 0,03 -3,45 0,02   0,17 0,01 4,61   1,10     0 0,24      0,07        
1989 0,32 -1,13 0,07 -2,67 0,04   0,14 0,01 3,76   -0,85    0 0,17      -0,07       
1990 0,26 -1,36 0,11 -2,21 0,04   0,18 0,02 2,84   -0,92    1 -0,17    -0,34       
1991 0,36 -1,04 0,10 -2,35 -0,01 0,16 0,02 1,36   -1,48    1 0,19      0,35        
1992 0,46 -0,78 0,04 -3,27 -0,06 0,17 0,01 1,86   0,50     1 -0,05    -0,24       
1993 0,43 -0,84 0,01 -4,34 -0,02 0,14 0,00 1,60   -0,26    1 0,23      0,28        
1994 0,46 -0,79 0,02 -4,12 0,00   0,13 0,00 3,15   1,55     0 0,06      -0,18       
1995 0,43 -0,84 0,03 -3,48 0,01   0,16 0,00 2,92   -0,23    1 0,21      0,16        
1996 0,42 -0,88 0,02 -3,77 -0,01 0,18 0,00 3,28   0,36     0 0,14      -0,07       
1997 0,49 -0,72 0,02 -3,94 -0,00 0,26 0,01 3,71   0,43     0 0,16      0,02        
1998 0,38 -0,96 0,03 -3,55 0,01   0,33 0,01 2,47   -1,25    1 0,25      0,09        
1999 0,34 -1,08 0,06 -2,85 0,03   0,43 0,03 3,36   0,89     0 0,25      0,01        
2000 0,25 -1,38 0,06 -2,84 0,00   0,42 0,02 4,24   0,89     0 -0,13    -0,38       
2001 0,22 -1,53 0,16 -1,85 0,10   0,50 0,08 1,72   -2,52    1 -0,17    -0,04       
2002 0,30 -1,21 0,22 -1,49 0,07   0,47 0,10 2,06   0,34     1 -0,20    -0,03       
2003 0,40 -0,91 0,06 -2,87 -0,17 0,62 0,04 2,80   0,74     1 0,34      0,53        
2004 0,59 -0,54 0,02 -3,97 -0,04 0,63 0,01 4,17   1,37     0 0,15      -0,19       
2005 0,57 -0,57 0,04 -3,27 0,02   0,71 0,03 3,61   -0,56    0 0,10      -0,05       
2006 0,55 -0,60 0,01 -4,56 -0,03 0,74 0,01 4,08   0,47     0 0,21      0,11        
2007 0,55 -0,60 0,01 -5,11 -0,00 0,79 0,00 3,96   -0,12    0 0,10      -0,11       
2008 0,34 -1,08 0,06 -2,85 0,05   0,95 0,06 1,44   -2,52    1 -0,40    -0,50       
2009 0,34 -1,08 0,17 -1,76 0,11   0,85 0,15 -2,11 -3,55    1 0,31      0,71        
2010 0,52 -0,66 0,02 -4,08 -0,15 1,21 0,02 4,01   6,12     0 0,12      -0,18       
2011 0,45 -0,79 0,02 -4,04 0,00   1,66 0,03 2,83   -1,18    1 -0,05    -0,17       
2012 0,45 -0,81 0,02 -4,08 -0,00 1,81 0,03 2,34   -0,49    1 0,17      0,22        
BRR: Moody's BOA: bn $
BDR: Moody's BDA: bn $
GDP: The World Bank
MSCIW: MSCI 
Sources:     
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